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The Human Brain in Fireground decision-making: trustworthy firefighting equipment?  
 
Background: How the limits of the human brain might affect fireground decision-making  
 
In July 1994, fourteen firefighters lost their lives when overcome by a wildfire that had 
suddenly shifted direction in the South Canyon of Storm King Mountain in Colorado. 
Reviews of the incident have suggested organizational lapses, but also that the incident 
commander made some “suboptimal” decisions (Useem, Cook and Sutton, 2005) consistent 
with having incomplete “Situation Awareness” or SA (perception, knowledge and prediction 
about the situation: Endsley, 1995; Patrick & Morgan, 2010). For example, he had apparently 
not requested an updated weather report that would have warned of the shift in wind 
conditions that ultimately led to the deaths of the firefighters. Nevertheless, analysis of the 
command decisions in these terms does not really explain why SA may have been incomplete 
or errors and oversights were made. The commander clearly attempted to manage the 
situation–for example, he had earlier requested a complete overview of the fireground and he 
heroically died trying to warn the firefighters trapped by the advancing firefront. Why then 
were fatal errors and omissions apparently made?  
 
Aside from wider organizational issues, the answer may be found in considering the natural 
limits of the human brain. Even the brains of highly trained and efficient professionals have 
restricted capacity to deal with information, especially under such extreme demands as those 
in the Storm King Mountain incident. Professionals improve performance within these natural 
limits by using prior experience to rapidly see and act on familiar patterns in situations 
(“Recognition Primed Decision- making”: Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Sirocco, 2010) but 
even in skilled professionals, the basic instrument for decision-making is still the human brain 
which can be stretched to its limits in changeable and dangerous conditions such as those in 
the Storm King wildfire. Under such conditions, there may be log-jams in key brain channels 
for taking in information from the outside world, focusing on that information and keeping 
relevant information in mind while making decisions. Psychologists refer to these abilities 
respectively as perception (seeing, etc.), attention and working memory and the brain 
processes for these abilities have known limits on how much information they can transmit or 
handle at any one time. To make matters worse, anxiety or fear in dangerous and stressful 
situations can overload these systems to further reduce their capacities. Excessive demands on 
these processing channels can tax the processing abilities of even the most experienced and 
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conscientious professionals who may then show natural tendencies to overlook key 
information or focus on irrelevant aspects. It would seem highly likely that the conditions on 
Storm King Mountain could have fostered such mental overload with tragic results. These 
limitations and tendencies of the human brain may be natural but can obviously have 
potentially serious consequences for fireground decision-making. To further understand these 
natural limits and tendencies, we have been conducting a programme of research with the 
ultimate aim of supporting safe decision-making for fire professionals. 
 
The research programme to date has involved a series of studies of the response of Fire and 
Rescue (FRS) crew and commanders in fireground training situations and simulations 
(tabletop, BA and incident command exercises) (Sallis, Catherwood, Edgar, Medley,  & 
Brookes, 2013; Catherwood, Sallis, Edgar, Medley, & Brookes, 2012; Catherwood,  Sallis, 
Edgar,  & Medley, 2011). Obviously these contexts cannot fully replicate actual fireground 
conditions, but the research has revealed patterns and tendencies with potentially serious 
consequences for real FRS situations. The main conclusion from these studies is that the fire 
personnel involved were well-trained professionals with good “Situation Awareness” (SA) or 
knowledge of the incident under study, but two issues were of concern. These may be linked 
to the limits of the human brain as described above and could explain tragic errors of 
decision-making such as may have occurred on Storm King Mountain.   
 
The first issue concerns a person’s SA. There are in fact two key aspects to SA: (i.) “actual 
SA”, the actual accuracy of the achieved SA compared to the ‘ground truth’ and (ii.) 
“perceived SA” , the person’s awareness or impression of their SA. If these are not in unison, 
critical errors of judgment may arise. It may be especially risky if individuals have poor SA 
but are unaware of this, believing that they fully understand the situation and so do not make 
efforts to update or improve their faulty SA. Why might such oversights occur? One 
explanation is that overload on the brain’s processing power may not allow an individual to 
register that there are gaps between actual and perceived SA with potentially risky 
consequences. Our research has highlighted a second aspect of decision-making that further 
shows how such oversights can arise.   
 
This second issue concerns the way that people sample or select from the information 
available about an incident. This can be described as their “bias” and concerns how they 
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mentally filter or scope the information on offer: whether they apply a narrow scope/fine 
filter or instead a broad scope/coarse filter. This is revealed in our research by the type of 
errors people made. The personnel in our studies made few errors but when errors were made, 
some people were more likely to make “miss” errors (overlooking key information) and 
others “false alarm” errors (treating information as true or useful even when not). 
 
These bias and error tendencies are undoubtedly linked to the natural limits of the human brain 
for handling information. Our finite brain capacity can either be (a.) concentrated on a part of 
the available information but at cost of missing other key aspects (conservative bias) or (b.) 
spread over a wider breadth of information but more thinly or shallowly, so it is difficult to 
decide what is “good” information, with “false alarm” errors likely (liberal bias). The omission 
of the Storm King commander to obtain the crucial weather report may be understandable in 
these terms. The situation is likely to have imposed a heavy load on brain resources, possibly 
causing a focus for selected aspects of the situation (e.g., cutting a fire-break on the mountain 
side) but at cost of making the “miss” error about the weather report.   
 
Neither a conservative or liberal bias is necessarily “right” or “wrong”: a narrow focus may be 
best for some phases of an incident and a wider focus for others and people may move 
between these at different times in an incident. Nevertheless an inappropriate bias may 
increase the risk of error and it seems important to further understand bias tendencies. Our 
research shows that for any incident, individuals show a general tendency towards one type of 
bias or the other. The next question of interest is whether a person’s bias remains the same 
type across different incidents or situations. It may be that there is a “resting bias” perhaps due 
to inborn personality traits or life experiences - or otherwise individual bias patterns might 
vary with the circumstances: for example, a FRS commander may show a cautious pattern if 
there is high risk of injury to self or others but be more liberal when low-value property is at 
risk. Our research study described here explored these issues of actual versus perceived SA 
and the associated Bias patterns of operational FRS crew and commanders in two tabletop 
exercises. 
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Method  
 
The Participants in both exercises were 20 operational UK firefighters and commanders 
(including both full-time and retained/part-time personnel) aged from 19 to 53 years (mean 
age 38 years). All participants gave informed consent for their participation. 
 
Two different fireground scenarios (one in a house, one in a factory) were shown as 
powerpoint presentations projected onto a large screen.  Each scenario involved slides 
displaying turn-out sheets, maps, plans of the building, photos of the local area,  videos of the 
“drive to” and conversations with “neighbours” (for the house fire) or the “foreman” (for the 
factory fire) and finally a series of views of the fireground. All participants did both the 
House or Factory fire exercise at different sessions. At intervals the presentation was stopped 
and a series of true/false statements about the scenario were presented (overall, half were 
false and half were true with this being in random order).  For each statement, participants 
were asked to indicate whether they believed the statement to be true or false, and to rate (on 
a scale of 1 (guess) to 4 (certain)) how confident they were that their answer was correct.   
 
For the house exercise, 26 questions were asked, for example:  • The front window was open on your arrival T/F  • There is a possible Explosion hazard upstairs T/F  
For the factory fire, there were 30 questions, for example: • Sandwich panels are a risk in these premises T/F • There were cylinders outside the factory T/F. 
 
Each participant viewed the scenarios in a group session, but responded to the questions 
individually by recording answers on a response sheet. Participants were not given feedback 
during the exercise as to whether their responses were correct or not, but were informed of 
this during the de-briefing. The answers to the questions were used to calculate SA and Bias 
using QASA (Quantitative Analysis of Situation Awareness) based on a “signal detection” 
approach (Green & Swets, 1966).  QASA has been used by the investigators in previous 
studies of fireground decision-making (for further details see Catherwood et al., 2011, 2012; 
Sallis et al., 2013; Edgar & Edgar, 2007). It uses the proportion of correct and incorrect 
responses to provide a measure of the person’s actual SA (whether they could tell true from 
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false information) and the proportion of true and false responses to provide a measure of the 
person’s Bias (conservative or liberal). A measure of how participants perceived their own 
SA (“perceived SA”) was also provided by calculating the average (mean score) of the 
“confidence ratings” the participants gave for their responses.  
 
 
Results  
 
The SA (actual SA), Bias and Confidence (perceived SA) for the House and Factory 
exercises were calculated for each person. QASA provides a score for SA (corrected for 
guessing) from +100 (perfect SA) to -100 (totally misguided and wrong SA). Bias is also 
scaled from +100 (very conservative bias) to -100 (very liberal bias), with zero meaning no 
bias either way.  Confidence is also scaled from +100 (the person believes that all their 
answers are correct) to -100 (the person believes that all their answers are wrong). 
 
Actual SA was high in both exercises: with a mean (average) of 69.4 for the House exercise 
and 66.5 for the Factory exercise. Also people perceived their SA (“perceived SA”) to be at a 
similar level over the two exercises, meaning that if they had high confidence in their SA in 
one exercise they also had high confidence in the other exercise – or low confidence in one 
and low confidence in the other (statistical correlation across the exercises is significant: r 
=.629, p =.003). Of concern however is that there is no statistically significant correlation 
between actual SA scores and “perceived SA” scores. In other words, people may have had 
poor SA but perceived their SA as good or vice versa, had good SA but judged it to be poor.  
 
The other important finding is that people showed Bias tendencies (no-one had a Bias score 
of zero or “no bias”). In the House exercise, 7 people had a conservative Bias and the other 
13 a liberal bias, while in the Factory exercise, 8 had a conservative bias and the other 12 a 
liberal bias. People with a conservative bias accepted a narrower amount of information as 
being true but made more “miss” errors (eg., in the factory fire exercise,  they may have said 
“False” to the true statement: There was a cylinder next to a body, making a “miss” error). 
On the other hand, people with a liberal bias accepted a broader scope of information as true, 
but made more “false alarm” errors (eg., they may have said “True” to the false statement: 
The roller-shutter access was clear, making a “false alarm” error). Of interest is that there 
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was no significant correlation between the Bias scores across the two exercises, so people had 
a conservative bias in the house exercise and liberal in the factory exercise, or vice versa.  
 
Conclusion: is the human brain a trustworthy firefighting tool? 
 
The firefighters in our study had good SA overall and a level of confidence in their own SA 
that was consistent across situations.  This perceived SA was not however strongly related to 
actual SA.  Some of the firefighters in these exercises considered their SA to be good when in 
fact it was poor (and the converse).  This lack of alignment between actual and perceived SA 
could conceivably lead to decision errors if it occurred on the fireground.  
 
The results for the Bias scores also indicate a basis for decision error. Some people had a 
cautious approach to accepting information as true and others a more liberal approach. The 
former represents a conservative bias with a narrow focus on the incident that also produces 
“miss” errors, while the latter is a liberal bias with a broader but shallower processing of the 
information, leading to “false alarms”. People could be conservative in one exercise and 
liberal in the other, so bias may vary over situation or possibly over time, but any bias 
tendency could produce error in fireground decision-making.  
 
The gap between actual and perceived SA along with the bias patterns allows for the 
possibility of error in decision-making that could have serious consequences in a real 
fireground situation. These tendencies are most likely due to processing constraints in the 
channels of the human brain. The brain systems of these personnel clearly provided generally 
good SA, but also displayed limits so that the personnel did not register the gaps between 
their actual and perceived SA and also showed bias and error tendencies. Of course these 
exercises cannot reproduce the conditions of the actual fireground. Nonetheless, if such 
patterns are apparent in the relatively calm environment for these simulations, they may be 
even more apparent under highly stressful and dangerous conditions such as those that 
assailed the Storm King commander in 1994. The further direction for our research is to 
develop guidelines that could support FRS personnel in monitoring their own SA and Bias 
patterns under such conditions.  The human brain can be a highly effective firefighting tool, 
but its limitations are ignored at considerable peril. 
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